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DRESSER INDUSTRIES: THE FAILURE OF FOREIGN POLICY
TRADE CONTROLS UNDER THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACT 1
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 30, 1981, in response to the perceived role of the Soviet
Union in the repression of the Polish trade union Solidarity,2 the Reagan
Administration strengthened already existing controls on trade with the
USSR.3 The stated goal of these sanctions was to prevent the USSR from
acquiring equipment and technology that the Soviets required to complete a
natural gas pipeline connecting Western Europe with the gas fields of Sibe-
ria.4 The trade controls were promulgated under the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (E.A.A.), and were intended to prevent U.S. firms, and foreign
firms using U.S. goods and technology, from delivering pipeline equipment
to the Soviets.'
Dresser (France), a French subsidiary of Dresser Industries of Dallas,
Texas,' defied the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. trade controls. Dresser
1. 50 U.S.C. app. §§2401-2420 (1982). The Export Administration Act expired on
March 30, 1984. It was extended by Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984).
2. On December 12, 1981, in response to union activities, Polish authorities imposed mar-
tial law in order "to prevent national castastrophe." Smith, Crackdown on Solidarity, TIME,
Dec. 21, 1981, at 36.
3. President Reagan imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union as a "response to the Soviet
Union's heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland." 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (Jan.
5, 1982).
This regulation placed oil and gas transmission equipment under export controls. Oil and
gas exploration equipment had been under export controls since August 1, 1978. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 33,699 (Aug. 1, 1978).
4. 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (Jan. 5, 1982).
5. The December 1981 sanctions forbade exportation of oil and gas goods and technology
by U.S. firms to the Soviet Union, as well as to third parties without written assurance that the
goods and technology would not be transferred to the USSR. See 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (Jan. 5,
1982).
On June 18, 1982, President Reagan extended these sanctions "to include equipment pro-
duced by the subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad as well as equipment produced under
licenses issued by U.S. companies." Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 820 (June 18, 1982).
The expanded export controls were published in 47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (June 24, 1982)
(Codified at 15 C.F.R. §§376, 379, 385). See Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dis-
pute-A Compelling Case For the Adoption of Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct, 8 MD. J.-
INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 12 (1984).
6. "Dresser (France) is a French corporation with its main office and manufacturing
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(France) was to supply pipeline contractors with 21 natural gas compres-
sors, 7 the manufacture of which involved technology licensed to Dresser
(France) by its U.S. parent.8 Dresser (France) violated the trade controls
by shipping three compressors to the USSR on August 26, 1982. 9
This Note will examine the issues raised in the ensuing legal battle
between Dresser Industries and Dresser (France) on the one hand, and the
United States Department of Commerce on the other. The vehicle for the
trade controls, the Export Administration Act of 1979, will be examined, as
will be principles of international law justifying extraterritorial trade con-
trols. Finally, the overwhelming failure of the E.A.A. controls will be ex-
amined in light of relevant political factors.
Discussion of the E.A.A. will be limited to its role in furthering U.S.
foreign policy interests. Particular attention will be given to the issues sur-
rounding the extent to which the United States government may exercise
legal jurisdiction over foreign corporations manufacturing goods under a li-
cense10 from a U.S. corporation and the extent to which U.S. denial of
export licenses under the E.A.A. will succeed in effectuating U.S. foreign
policy interests.
II. Dresser Industries: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
On August 26, 1982, Dresser (France), in violation of the President's
plant in France." Brief of Plaintiffs at 3, Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Malcolm Baldrige, No. 82-
2385 (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction) (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1982). Its major products include compressors and pumps
for the oil and gas industry. Dresser (France) "is almost entirely owned by Dresser A.G.
(Valduz), a Liechtenstein corporation which in turn is wholly owned by Dresser [Industries], a
Delaware corporation with headquarters in Dallas, Texas." Id.
The Soviet pipeline project, its participants and the nature of the conflict are discussed in
Merciai, supra note 5, at 1-18.
7. Brief for the Movant at 4, In the Matter of Dresser (France), S.A., Case No. 632
(Motion to Vacate Temporary Denial of Export Privileges and Memorandum in Support),
U.S. Department of Commerce I.T.A., (Aug. 27, 1982).
A prime contractor for the pipeline is the French firm Creusot-Loire S.A. Creusot-Loire
and Machino-import, a Soviet purchasing agency, undertook to purchase the 21 compressors
from Dresser (France). Id.
8. Id. Dresser (France) licensed the technology from Dresser Industries in 1976.
9. See Oberdorfer, Equipment is Shipped to Soviets, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al,
col. 6.
10. Readers should be aware that the term "license" will be used in this paper in two
different senses. "License" may refer to a permit issued by the U.S. government to export U.S.
goods or technology, or it may refer to an agreement between a U.S. corporation and a foreign
firm, enabling the foreign firm to manufacture or make use of U.S. goods and technology
abroad.
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December 1981 and June 1982 trade controls, shipped three natural gas
compressors to Riga, a city-port in Latvia, USSR."1 Two hours after the
Soviet ship Borodine set sail, the United States Department of Commerce
responded by petitioning the Hearing Commission for the International
Trade Administration for an order temporarily denying all export privileges
to Dresser (France)."9 The order was granted that same day, and all of
Dresser (France)'s outstanding U.S. export licenses were thereby revoked.
This denied Dresser (France) the privilege of participating "in any transac-
tion involving commodities or technical data exported from the U.S." under
any validated, qualified, or general export license.' s Twelve days later, the
order was modified so that only licenses pertaining to "oil and gas explora-
tion, production, transmission, or refinement" were affected. "
In September and October of 1982, orders temporarily denying the ex-
port privileges of several other European firms were issued. 6 These firms
were also using U.S. goods and technology for the manufacture of merchan-
11. Oberdorfer, supra note 9, at Al, col. 6.
12. The petition was made pursuant to 15 C.F.R. §368 (1981).
13. In the Matter of Dresser (France), S.A., Case No. 632, Order Temporarily Denying
Export Privileges, U.S. Department of Commerce, I.T.A., (Aug. 26, 1983).
Another French firm, Creusot-Loire, S.A. was also denied export privileges for its part in
the shipment of the three turbines. See In the Matter of Creusot-Loire, S.A., Case No. 633,
Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, U.S. Department of Commerce, I.T.A., Aug.
26, 1982.
14. In the Matter of Dresser (France), S.A., Case No. 632, Order Modifying Temporary
Denial of Export Privileges, U.S. Department of Commerce, I.T.A. (Sept. 7, 1983), at 3.
This decision was upheld by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administra-
tion on November 1, 1982. See Dresser Industries v. Malcolm Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C.
Nov. 4, 1982), for a complete history of the Commerce Department's administrative decisions.
15. Thomas W. Hoya, Hearing Commissioner for the International Trade Administration
of the Department of Commerce, issued Orders Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
against:
1. Nuovo Pignone S.p.A. Industrie Meccaniche E Fonderia (of Italy), Case No. 634, Sept. 4,
1982. This order was in response to the export of two gas turbines containing General Electric
rotors.
2. John Brown Engineering, Ltd. (of Scotland), Case No. 635, Sept. 9, 1982. In response to
the export of six gas turbines with General Electric rotors.
3. AEG-Kanis Turbinenfabrik GmbH (of Germany), Case No. 637, Oct. 5, 1982. In response
to the export to the Soviet Union of two gas turbines built with rotors manufactured under
General Electric license.
4. Mannesmann Anlagenbau Aktiengesellschaft (of Germany), Case No. 638, Oct. 5, 1982. In
response to the export of the same two turbines that AEG-Kanis shipped to the USSR.
For additional details on the above orders, see the case numbers referred to above (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, I.T.A.), or the following issues of the United States Department of
Commerce, Commerce News: G82-34 (Sept. 4, 1982) - Nuovo Pignone; G82-35 (Sept. 9,
1982) - John Brown; G82-41 (Sept. 5. 1982) - AEG-Kanis and Mannesmann Anlagenbau.
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dise for the Soviet pipeline. During this same period Dresser Industries and
Dresser (France) filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a pre-
liminary injunction in an attempt to block the Commerce Department's de-
nial of export privileges to the Dresser firms. These motions were both
denied."
The conflict came to an abrupt end on November 13, 1982, when the
Commerce Department, under presidential instructions, "removed its regu-
lations governing the export of [oil and gas] equipment and technology to
the Soviet Union and Poland issued in December 1981 and June 1982," and
implemented new licensing regulations.1 7 The newly modified licensing reg-
ulations permit the export of oil and gas transmission equipment, including
compressors and turbines, under general license. The intent of the policy is
to permit the export of equipment for exploration and production, while
controlling the export of manufacturing equipment and new technologies.18
III. LEGAL ASPECTS: JURISDICTION UNDER THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION ACT
The distinction between legal and political arguments is somewhat arti-
ficial in foreign policy and trade matters. The pertinent laws are designed to
accomodate both legal considerations such as due process and fundamental
fairness, and political interests such as furthering the foreign policy of the
United States."0 It is nevertheless useful to examine the legal aspects of
instituting trade controls separately from the political issues, because it is
possible for the legal mechanism to function without achieving the desired
political results.
Historically, foreign policy and foreign affairs have been managed by
the Executive Branch. The President's present statutory authority to im-
16. Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Malcolm Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982); and
Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Malcolm Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1982).
17. U.S. Department of Commerce, Commerce News. ITA 82-155, Nov. 16, 1982.
18. Id. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 390, 399 (Nov. 16, 1982), for the revisions.
19. 50 U.S.C. §2402(2)(B) is a good example of the political interests furthered by the
E.A.A. The protection of due process rights is best seen in the hearing procedures established
by the Department of Commerce for firms whose export licenses have been revoked or denied.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. The President's authority to act in foreign affairs is said to come from the Article 11
clauses of the Constitution making the President Commander-in-Chief, vesting executive
power in the President, giving the President the power to appoint ambassadors, public minis-
ters and other consuls, and the Article 11 clause that compels him to faithfully execute the
laws.
The President's exclusive power in the foreign policy field was established in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). This power is said to be at its
1984]
126 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
plement foreign trade sanctions is the Export Administration Act of 1979.
The Act grants the President the authority to "prohibit or curtail the expor-
tation of any goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States . . . to the extent necessary to further signifi-
cantly the foreign policy of the United States .... "
Because the President's foreign policy powers are expansive, Congress
designed the Export Administration Act to give the President guidelines
within which to act in the foreign policy realm. Specifically, the Export
Administration Act establishes as United States policy the control of ex-
ports in order to minimize uncertainty in export policy, encourage trade,
protect the domestic economy, promote national security, fulfill interna-
tional obligations, further economic growth, further foreign policy objec-
tives, oppose restrictive trade practices, and oppose terrorism.2
In the Dresser controversy, the parties viewed the sanctions as "foreign
policy" controls .2  Among Dresser's arguments in its request for a prelimi-
nary injunction was the claim that foreign policy controls under the E.A.A.
cannot be extended to Dresser (France) because the United States lacks
jurisdiction.24 Dresser contended that because the trade controls are for for-
eign policy and not for national security purposes, Dresser (France) as a
foreign subsidiary is beyond the jurisdiction of the Department of Com-
maximum when Congress and the President are acting in accord. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
21. 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(a)(1).
President Carter delegated many of his responsibilities under the E.A.A. to the Secretary
of Commerce and the Secretary of State. See Exec. Order No. 12214, 45 C.F.R. 29783
(1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. 32403 (1982).
22. 50 U.S.C. app. §2402.
23. Brief for the Defendants at 14-15, Dresser Industries v. Malcolm Baldrige, No. 82-
2385, (D.D.C. Oct. 1982) (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction) Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 73.
In order to implement trade controls for foreign policy purposes, the President should
consider criteria specified in §2405(b), (c), and (d) of the E.A.A. See infra text accompanying
notes 78-109.
24. That regulation [the denial order] represented an unprecedented administrative effort
to impose U.S. foreign policy controls on persons and transactions previously considered
outside United States jurisdiction for such purposes. There is no explicit statutory author-
ization for this extension, and it runs counter to past practice under similar statutory
language in predecessor statutes. Moreover, any ambiguities in the statutory language
must be resolved in favor of a construction that is consistent with international law.
Dresser (France) is a French company, and the conduct in question is centered in France.
The United States has no authority under international law to regulate French economic
affairs when that regulation would conflict with the laws and policies of the government
of France.
Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 18-19.
[Vol. 8
DRESSER INDUSTRIES AND THE EAA
merce and the U.S. courts. The argument was predicated on three premises:
(1) jurisdiction under the E.A.A. is narrower when the Act is being used to
achieve foreign policy as opposed to national security objectives,25 (2) con-
trols affecting foreign subsidiaries are impermissible because of their "ex-
traterritorial" impact,26 and (3) controls affecting foreign subsidiaries are
impermissible because of their retroactive effect."'
A. Narrow Jurisdiction
With the exception of the controls that President Carter placed on So-
viet oil and gas technology in 1978,8 extraterritorial foreign policy controls
based on the E.A.A. have never been applied to foreign subsidiaries of
25. Id. at 53-54. "In the area of trade controls, a distinction has always been drawn
between national-security controls, where jurisdiction is relatively broad, and foreign policy
controls, where jurisdiction is relatively narrow. International law recognizes this same distinc-
tion." Id.
26. Id. at 62. "Yet the language and history of the 1979 statute show no evidence of
congressional intent to reverse this history and to authorize sweeping extraterritorial and retro-
active controls of foreign policy purposes." See Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 62-66.
27. Id. at 54. "[Nlever before on any ground has the United States attempted to regulate
the exports by foreign persons of products of U.S. technology where that technology has been
exported prior to the imposition of controls and without any agreement by the recipient to
abide by any controls that might thereafter be imposed." Id.
Dresser Industries further contended that Dresser (France) was compelled by the French
government to ship the compressors to the Soviet Union. Dresser asserted that, under the doc-
trine of foreign sovereign compulsion, Dresser (France) should not be punished for matters
beyond its control, especially when Dresser (France) employees faced civil and penal penalties
if they violated the terms of the French order. Id. at 35-41.
Dresser buttressed its position by citing §25 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TiE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), for the proposition that the United
States could acquire jurisdiction over Dresser (France) only through an agreement with
France. This proposition is in conflict, however, with the purpose of the E.A.A. as interpreted
by the Administration. See infra text accompanying notes 36-38. The proposition is also con-
trary to §418(2) of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(Rev. Draft No. 2, Mar. 27, 1981). See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
Responding to the foreign sovereign compulsion argument, the Administration averred
that Dresser (France) failed to satisfy its extraordinary burden of demonstrating that it sought
to be relieved from the French order, and further that Dresser (France) acted in bad faith by
encouraging the French government to issue the order requisitioning the compressors. Brief for
the Defendants, supra note 23, at 30.
The justness and propriety of penalizing a foreign subsidiary because it sought support
from its host government can be debated, but this is not the real issue. The question is actually
one of choice of law; more particularly, to what extent a foreign subsidiary should be bound by
the laws of the nation in which its parent company is incorporated. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 39-69.
28. See supra note 2.
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American firms," and even in the case of the Carter controls, while ship-
ments of oil and gas technology were scrutinized more closely, licenses were
eventually granted.' 0 Usually, when the U.S. has sought to impose extrater-
ritorial controls, Congressional acts other than the E.A.A. were employed.
For example, under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), s1 regula-
tions were issued to embargo certain Communist nations, and prohibit the
sale by U.S. firms and their foreign subsidiaries of strategic commodities to
other Communist countries."a
The enabling jurisdictional language of the E.A.A., "persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States," is found both in the national security
section" and in the foreign policy section of the Act.'4 This phrase is not
defined, however, within the E.A.A.; therefore, it is necessary to look for
guidance to definitions in other Congressional acts regulating international
trade. The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) provides such a
definition.
The TWEA defines "person" as "an individual, partnership, associa-
tion, company, or other unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation
29. Abbott, Linking Trade Controls to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls
in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 792-793.
30. Id.
31. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982).
32. The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §500 (1981), and the Transaction
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §505 (1981), placed a partial trade embargo on certain Com-
munist nations. These regulations extend to persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." Person is defined as:
1. Any person, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of the United States;
2. Any person actually within the United States;
3. Any corporation under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, possession,
or district of the United States; and
4. Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, wheresoever organized
or doing business; which is owned, or controlled by persons specified in paragraphs...
(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
31 C.F.R. §500.329 (1981); 31 C.F.R. §505.20 (1981). See Marcuss & Richard, Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM.
J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 462-64 (1981).
Also, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1706 (Supp. III, 1979), was used in the Iranian crisis to prohibit transactions between the
target nation (Iran) and the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks. See 31 C.F.R. §535.329
(1980). The enabling jurisdictional language in the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §1701, is similar to that
found in the TWEA; however, the IEEPA is a mechanism for dealing with the economic
aspects of extraordinary international crises, and is therefore less commonly used. See gener-
ally Marcuss & Richard, at 460-62.
33. 50 U.S.C. app. §2402(a).
34. 50 U.S.C. app. §2405(a).
[Vol. 8
DRESSER INDUSTRIES AND THE EAA
or body politic.""5 This definition forms the basis for an argument by infer-
ence. In the Dresser case, the Administration persuasively argued that the
legislative history of the E.A.A. supports the view that jurisdiction under
the E.A.A. was meant to be as broad as jurisdiction under the TWEA."
Assuming legislative history was not on the Administration's side, support
for the argument that the E.A.A. was meant to give a broad, extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction can be found in international law, which allows a State to
seize extraterritorial jurisdiction for certain national security purposes?3
Extending the argument to its extreme, it is possible to infer that, because
both the foreign policy and national security sections of the E.A.A. use the
same jurisdictional language, Congress intended jurisdiction in foreign pol-
icy matters to be as broad as jurisdiction in national security affairs, thus
giving the President the widest possible jurisdiction in the foreign policy
realm.u
B. Extraterritorial Impact
If indeed Congress has authorized the President to implement extrater-
ritorial foreign policy trade controls, that authority may yet be invalid
under international law. An exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by one
State may violate the sovereignty of another State, in the absence of con-
sent. The question is, when, if ever, should extraterritorial jurisdiction be
permitted in international law?
International law recognizes that a State may exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction in order to protect its national security. 8 This exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction is justified under the "protective or security princi-
ple.' 40 While the protective principle is readily acknowledged as a justifica-
35. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2(c) and § 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1981) quoted supra note 32.
36. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 23, at 46-49.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45.
38. Such an interpretation of the scope of the E.A.A. is supported by §418 of the RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Rev. Draft No. 2, Mar. 27,
1981). If enacted, §418(2) would provide that the United States has "jurisdiction to apply its
laws to corporations (or similar entities) organized under the laws of a foreign state that are
substantially owned or controlled by nationals of the United States (including corporations
organized under the laws of the United States.)"
The Official Comments to §418 predicate this jurisdiction on the nationality principle and
define ownership in terms of actual corporate control and nationality of the owning individuals.
This is a doubtful position. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57; see also Merciai, supra
note 5, at 26-31.
39. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 445-447.
40. Id. at 445-447. See also J. STEINER & F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
MATERIALS AND TEXT 856 (1976), in which the protective principle is defined as "determining
jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense."
1984]
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tion for protecting the national security of a nation, strong concerns are
expressed when nations seek to justify their exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction on foreign policy grounds."' This problem is complicated by the fact
that depending upon how one defines national security, the protective prin-
ciple may have a limitless reach."'
Use of the protective principle as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, whether for national security or foreign policy purposes, can impinge
upon another nation's sovereignty. While it is a given fact that all nations
will protect their national security, controversy remains as to whether a na-
tion should be able to advance its foreign policy interests through reliance
on the protective principle.
Limits to the application of the protective principle have been sug-
gested, such as allowing the doctrine to be invoked only when there is a
"real necessity for the action," or when the "primary effect of the crime is
to threaten" the state.'" These limitations are vague. More helpful is the
ruling in the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Com-
pany, Ltd. " There the International Court of Justice decided that the pro-
tective principle should not be invoked for purely economic harm."
Dresser took the analysis one step further by arguing that the protec-
tive principle does not justify any extraterritorial foreign policy trade con-
trols .4 In support of this proposition Dresser cited Compagnie Europ&ene
des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V.,47 a Dutch case holding that
the protective principle cannot be applied by the United States in cases
involving American subsidiaries unless national security or national credit
worthiness is at stake.' 8 This holding seems to impose realistic limits on the
41. Id. at 445-447.
42. Id. at 445. But see id. at 459 for an example of the grey area between foreign policy
and national security. See also Elliot, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statu-
tory Resolution of the Right to Export Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Con-
trols, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 290 (1981), for the proposition that increasingly the
Executive is classifying routine foreign policy conflicts as national security matters.
43. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 445, 446.
44. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New
Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (1970). This case can also be found in J.
STEINER & F. VAGTS, supra note 40, at 222.
45. 1970 I.C.J. 4, at para. 46. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 446.
46. Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 73.
47. Compagnie Europ6ene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., No. 82/716
(Hague D.C.)(Sept. 17, 1982).
48. Id. at para. 7.3.3. Compagnie Europ&ene is cited in Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6,
at 72, 73. The case itself is translated from the Dutch and is appended to the Brief of Plain-
tiffs. Of course, as a Dutch case, the decision in Compagnie Europien does not bind American
courts.
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extent to which the protective principle should be used to justify extraterri-
torial jurisdiction.
The overall helpfulness of doctrines such as the protective principle has
been challenged. Commentators suggest that use of doctrines may actually
work to divert attention from important underlying considerations.4 9 Per
haps the better approach, therefore, to problems of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is to concentrate instead on the relevant statutes, international law, and
policies and interests of concerned governments."0
The Administration seems to have partially adopted this approach in
the Dresser case. The Administration argued that while international law is
part of the law of the United States, Congressional acts such as the E.A.A.
must take precedence when they conflict with or supercede international
law.51
Unfortunately, the District Court never reached the interesting inter-
national law questions presented in the Dresser controversy. If Congress
had been found to have authorized extraterritorial foreign policy trade con-
trols under the E.A.A., which was the Administration's contention and the
preliminary issue, it would have been particularly interesting to see that
authority reconciled with the following principles of United States and in-
ternational law:
1. The fundamental principle of international law that "each state has
a duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of
other states.""2
2. The territorial principle of international law as modified by the ef-
fects doctrine, which would require the United States to explain its use
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a situation in which it is not experienc-
ing substantial (negative) effects as a "direct and foreseeable result" of
the European allies shipping natural gas related goods and technology
to the Soviets.58
3. The recent holding in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,"
in which the Supreme Court held that a wholly owned Japanese subsid-
49. J. STEINER & F. VAGTS, supra note 40, at 880-881.
50. Id. at 881.
51. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 23, at 51-52. In support of contention, the Gov-
ernment cites among others: Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and the Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
52. Marcuss & Richards, supra note 32, at 440.
53. On the territorial principle and the effects doctrine generally, see Merciai, supra note
5, at 25; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 441-43; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §18(b) (1965).
54. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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iary, located in New York, is an American company because it is incor-
porated under the laws of New York, and further that as an American
company it must comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 5
4. The long respected Charming Betsy" dictum:
It has always been observed, that an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible con-
struction remains, and consequently, can never be construed to vio-
late neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, farther than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country."'
The Administration did not abandon all principles of international law.
It argued in the alternative that the United States could assert jurisdiction
over Dresser (France) based on the nationality principle." Under the na-
tionality principle, each State has jurisdiction "to prescribe rules of conduct
for its nationals even if they are outside their home country."59 The princi-
ple works well with respect to individuals, but problems occur when the
principle is used to establish jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.
Unless foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations may themselves be
considered nationals of the United States, the nationality principle
would offer little basis for prescribing rules for their activities. By
contrast, if such subsidiaries can be characterized as U.S. nationals,
the legitimacy of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
U.S. government is greatly strengthened, since it is "indisputa-
ble. . . that nothing in international law precludes a State from
punishing one of its juristic persons for a crime committed outside
its territory."6 0
If a corporation and its subsidiaries can be considered nationals, there
is still the question of what nation can claim them as its own. There are at
least four proposed tests in international law: (1) place of incorporation; (2)
55. Id. at 2381. See also Lewin, Cloudy Legal Picture on Export Ban, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1982, at 31, 32, col. 2.
56. 2 Cranch 64 (1804).
57. Id. at 118.
58. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 23, at 52.
59. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 443.
60. Id. at 444. "In allocating corporate entities States for the purposes of diplomatic pro-
tection, international law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy governing the
nationality of individuals." Barcelona Traction, supra note 44, at para. 70.
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location of the main office; (3) locus of ownership and control; and (4) fac-
tors such as where the majority of corporate activity will occur."
In the Dresser controversy, the Administration applied the location of
ownership and control test. 2 The Administration's approach was to empha-
size "substance over mere formality," and "the realities of actual con-
trol." 68 Because Dresser (France) is owned and controlled by Dresser In-
dustries, a company located and incorporated in the United States, the
Administration contended that the nationality principle would permit the
United States to assert jurisdiction over Dresser (France)."
The issue of corporate nationality came before the International Court
of Justice in Barcelona Traction. In that case, the International Court of
Justice weighed the different factors linking a company to either Canada or
Belguim, looking particularly for a "close and permanent connection" with
one government or the other.65 Barcelona Traction can be read as casting
doubt on the locus of ownership and control test."6 Indeed, Dresser argued
that Barcelona Traction favors the place of incorporation test.67 However,
the case itself says that "in the particular field of the diplomatic protection
of corporate entities, no absolute test of the 'genuine connection' has found
general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied are of a relative nature,
and sometimes links with one State have to be weighed against those of
another."6 8 Thus, while emphasis was placed on the State of incorporation,
it was not the sole determinative factor.
It is clear that neither the protective principle nor the nationality prin-
ciple provide concrete guidance on the issue of the extent to which the
United States may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Both doctrines, but
particularly the nationality principle, are in constant flux, and did not meet
the needs of either party in this conflict. Settlement of the issue must await
not only another case, but perhaps also a more consistent theory on which
the United States can base its claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
61. Id. at 455-56. See also Merciai, supra note 5, at 29.
62. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 23, at 53.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Administration believed that its position with regard to jurisdiction was par-
ticularly reasonable in this situation. A deposition from the president of the Dresser Compres-
sor Group (of which Dresser (France) is a subdivision) shows that this individual had the
authority to order Dresser (France) to obey or disobey the requisition order. He chose to disre-
gard the American controls. The Dresser Compressor Group is controlled by Dresser Indus-
tries of Texas. Id.
65. Barcelona Traction, supra note 44, at para. 71.
66. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 457.
67. Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 71 n.l.
68. Barcelona Traction, supra note 44, at para. 70.
19841
134 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
the E.A.A. e°
C. Retroactive Application of Controls
Dresser Industries argued that the President of the United States lacks
the authority to impose trade controls retroactively, thus affecting goods
and technology licensed or contracted for before the announcement of the
trade sanctions. Hence, according to Dresser, goods and technology involved
in the pipeline project were beyond the United States' jurisdiction.7 0
With regard to licensed technology, the Administration maintained
that retroactive controls are permissible because technology owned by U.S.
corporations is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under section
2405 of the E.A.A.7 1 A licensing agreement does not transfer ownership;
therefore, U.S. jurisdiction continues throughout the licensing period. More
generally, the Administration suggested that it requires flexibility to pursue
its foreign policy objectives,7 2 and that private parties cannot by contract
limit the Government's regulatory authority.78
There is little legal authority to support the arguments raised by either
party. Moreover, while there may be merit in the Administration's conten-
tions, particularly with regard to licensed technology, the practical effect of
retroactive trade controls is to foster the impression that the U.S. is an
unreliable trading partner.7 '
D. Jurisdiction Under the E.A.A.: An Uncertain Conclusion
In determining that Dresser Industries and Dresser (France) were not
to be granted injunctive relief from the temporary denial order, the District
Court did not reach the jurisdictional issues. 75 The suits for injunctive relief
were denied on the basis of the test for injunctive relief set forth in Wash-
69. On the need for a consistent and unified theory on which to base extraterritorial juris-
diction, see generally Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32.
. 70. Brief of Plaintiffs, supra note 6, at 62. See generally the entire discussion in Brief of
Plaintiffs, at 54-66.
71. See Brief of Defendants, supra note 223, at 48.
72. Id. at 47-49.
73. Id. at 49.
74. This point is made here because, again, in the Dresser conflict the legal and political
issues were interdependent. The legal question of extraterritorial jurisdiction probably would
not have arisen had the political implications of the trade controls been more carefully consid-
ered in December 1981 and January 1982. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
75. Neither oK the two District Court orders upholding the controls discussed the jurisdic-
tional questions. See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Malcolm Baldrige, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C.
1982); and Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Malcolm Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1982).
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ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Holiday Tours, Inc.7 1 This
test permitted the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to side-step the merits of the case - the difficult foreign policy and juris-
diction questions. The implication is that the court expected to confront the
entire case at a later date. The issues in Dresser became moot with the
withdrawal of the sanctions in November 1982, but it is likely that many of
the jurisdiction questions concerning the E.A.A. and multinational corpora-
tions may arise in future cases.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE E.A.A.: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
The 1982 pipeline sanctions were both an instrumentality and a symbol
of United States foreign policy. The purpose of the sanctions was to deny
economic benefits to the Soviet Union in retaliation for activities contrary
to U.S. policies. The sanctions were used as well as a vehicle for the expres-
sion of U.S. indignation at the Soviet role in Poland.
The 1982 sanctions were also an overwhelming failure. In order to de-
termine why, the facts and circumstances surrounding the trade controls
will be examined in the light of broader economic and political theories.
A. The Instrumental Rationale
The denial of economic and political benefits to influence U.S. foreign
policy interests has been dubbed the "Instrumental Rationale" for foreign
policy trade controls. 7 The underlying theory of the instrumental rationale
is that foreign behavior can be coerced into conforming to U.S. objectives
by manipulating the economic and political costs of acquiring foreign goods
and technology.
Three essential requirements must be met, according to this theory, for
trade controls to achieve their intended result. First, the controls must pre-
vent the controlled item or technology from reaching the target country. 78
No embargo will be successful if the controls are circumvented.
This requirement is paralleled in the Export Administration Act of
1979. Section 2405(b)(5) of the E.A.A. requires the President to consider
"the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effec-
76. 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Under this standard the court must consider (1)
whether the moving party has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits;
(2) whether the moving party has demonstrated irreparable injury; (3) whether the issuance of
an injunction would substantially harm other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.
See Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 109 and No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1982) at 4.
77. See Abbott, supra note 29, at 798-99.
78. Id.
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tively." Yet, in 1982, the Reagan Administration enacted regulations to
prevent the delivery of equipment and technology necessary for the trans-
port of natural gas in the Soviet pipeline, without adequate means of en-
forcement. The controls proved ineffective against foreign licensees of U.S.
technology, such as Dresser (France), which proceeded to ship embargoed
equipment, thereby defeating the Administration's foreign policy objectives.
The status of Dresser (France) as a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation
was of little benefit. 9 This problem will persist in future trade controls until
the United States is assured of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and
licensees, or until U.S. licensors and parent companies are given reason to
pressure their subsidiaries and licensees into complying with U.S. laws.
Second, the trade controls will not succeed if the target nation is able
"easily and economically [to] obtain from other sources goods and technol-
ogy comparable to those denied by the United States."8 Section
2405(b)(1) of the E.A.A. requires the President to consider the probability
that controls will achieve the intended results in light of other factors such
as foreign availability. If the President ascertains that foreign availability of
the embargoed product exists, he is not barred from enacting controls, but
it is an important factor to consider - one that will most certainly have an
impact on the success of the controls.
There are problems with establishing a standard of foreign availability.
Determining whether a product is available from another source requires an
analysis of whether the alternative product is comparable and can be substi-
tuted economically, and whether the foreign source will sell the product to
the target nation. 81 Target nations such as the USSR are secretive as to
what they are able to procure overseas, 82 and it is difficult to assess to what
degree Western nations will move to fill the commercial void resulting from
79. See supra text accompanying notes 39-69.
The inability of the Government to enforce the controls was recognized by Presidential
advisors as well as by the corporations violating the controls. "A number of other Administra-
tion legal experts, however, maintained that the President was entering a legal quagmire with
few, if any, precedents, and with the end results very much in doubt. . . . Beyond that, they
added that foreign governments could block the regulations from applying to companies within
their jurisdiction and thus protect these companies against American legal action." Gelb, U.S.
Hardens Curbs on Soviet Gas Line, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1982, at 32, col. 4.
80. Abbott, supra note 29, at 800-801. Related to this is §2405(g) of the E.A.A., which
reads: "In applying export controls under this section, the President shall take all feasible steps
to initiate and conclude negotiations with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of
securing the cooperation of such foreign governments in controlling the export to countries and
consignees to which the United States export controls apply of any goods or technology compa-
rable to goods or technology controlled under this section."
81. Abbott, supra note 29, at 803. See also Marcuss & Richard, supra note 32, at 478.
82. Abbott, supra note 29, at 805.
[Vol. 8
DRESSER INDUSTRIES AND THE EAA
U.S. controls.88 Predicting which allies will violate U.S. controls by resell-
ing U.S. goods and technology poses further problems.
In 1978, one commentator observed that "for many elements of oil and
gas technology the United States [either] has a virtual monopoly" or the
equipment is manufactured under U.S. license and is subject to U.S. export
controls." This statement assumes that licensees will abide by U.S. export
controls and that foreign produced goods are not substitutable. In fact, it is
now apparent that not all foreign licensees of U.S. technology will obey
U.S. export laws, and it is questionable whether foreign geophysical equip-
ment is not of the same quality as U.S. equipment.8 A Library of Congress
study concludes that most of the equipment required for the pipeline could
be purchased from "non-U.S. sources," but at "different levels of quality
and terms of sales," because of the "wide availability of energy technology
and [the] underutilized capacity" of West European and Japanese plants."
From the inception of the ban on the export of oil and gas technology
and equipment to the Soviet Union, there has been controversy on the for-
eign availability of the requisite technology and goods. Events subsequent to
the enactment of the 1982 trade controls, however, showed that such for-
eign availability was drastically underestimated.87 It is quite possible that
the pipeline construction would not have been much impeded even if the
extraterritorial sanctions had been successful.
83. Id. at 808. Abbott observes that other nations usually pick up contracts that Ameri-
can corporations are unable to fulfill due to export controls. An example of this in the pipeline
controversy is the contract of the Caterpillar Tractor Co., a U.S. corporation, for the sale of
pipelaying machinery to the Soviet Union. This $90 million contract was picked up by Ko-
matsu of Japan after the Reagan Administration announced its controls. See Stern, Specters
and Pipe Dreams, 48 FOREIGN POL'Y 21 (1982), at 31.
84. Huntington, Trade, Technology and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy, 32 FOREIGN
POL'Y 63, 73-76 (1918).
85. Abbott, supra note 29, at 804-805. This is actually Abbott's reaction to the Hunting-
ton analysis. See Huntington, supra note 84. Abbott is relying on a statement of James Giffen
before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade (House Committee on
Foreign Affairs), 96th Congress, 1st Session 89 (1979), in which Giffen said that industry
representatives claimed that all geophysical equipment in use by American companies is
"available overseas with no reduction in quality."
86. J. HARDT & K. TOMLINSON, SOVIET GAS PIPELINE: U.S. OPTIONS, 1 (1982) (Library
of Congress, Congressional Research Service Major Issue System, Issue Brief No. 1B8 2020,
1982). See U.S. Sanctions Unlikely To Cause Lengthy Pipeline Delay, Economist Says, U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY, No. 418 at 621 (1982) (hereinafter cited as U.S. Sanctions).
87. For example, although there was some dispute, Dresser (France) claimed that it al-
ready had "all of the U.S. origin technology needed for its Soviet contract and [did] not need
to acquire U.S. origin commodities for the Soviet contract so that the denial order [could] not
serve an enforcement purpose." Agreement With Allies on Economic Relations With the East
May Be Close, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, No. 6, at 200 (1982).
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The third factor to consider in applying export controls is whether the
target nation is able to substitute domestically produced equipment for
United States goods and technology. 8 A successful embargo could en-
courage embargoed nations that are technologically advanced to develop
their own domestic industries for the embargoed goods. Not only would this
have an adverse affect on American business, but most likely it would also
be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Section 2405(b) of the E.A.A. requires the President to consider "the
probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy pur-
pose, in light of other factors. . ". ."89 One of these factors should be the
probability that the target nation will divert resources in order to develop
its own industries in embargoed areas. This interpretation is in accord with
§2405(b)(4), which requires the President to consider the effect of trade
controls on the "export performance of the United States."
Had President Reagan considered more carefully the possibility of the
Soviet Union substituting domestic technology and goods for the embargoed
items, as well as the Soviet Union's past success in coping with embargoes,
he might not have imposed this trade embargo. There is ample evidence
that the Soviets could cope with an embargo on gas pipeline goods, particu-
larly natural gas compressors, with only a minimum delay in the completion
of the pipeline.90
Over the last 25 years, several U.S. imposed embargoes have spurred
technological development in the USSR. The result has been a loss of mar-
kets for U.S. firms. For example, in 1962-1963, shortly after the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the United States embargoed large diameter steel pipes that
the Soviets needed for an oil pipeline.91 In 1961 the Soviets manufactured
no 40 inch steel pipe; by 1965, just two years after the embargo, the Soviets
were producing 600,000 tons of 40 inch pipe a year. 2
88. Abbott, supra note 29, at 810.
89. Also relevant is §2405(b)(2) and (3). Section 2405(b)(2) requires the President to
consider the compatibility of the proposed controls with U.S. foreign policy objectives. Section
2405(b)(3) requires the President to consider the reaction of other countries to the imposition
or expansion of export controls.
90. Jonathan Stern, an international energy consultant, believes that the pipeline could
have been "started up with as many compressor stations as the West Europeans can deliver
bolstered by the Soviet units with smaller capacity." Stern, supra note 83, at 33. The Soviet
Union produces natural gas compressors smaller than those produced in the West. While So-
viet compressors are 10-16 megawatts (MW), Western compressors are 25
MW's--significantly larger. Even given that Soviet compressors are smaller, they are adequate
for this project if used in "clusters." Id. See also Hardt, supra note 86, at 7.
91. Mufson, U.S. Effort to Block Soviet Pipeline Recalls Failed Embargo of 20 Years
Ago, Wall St. J., July 14, 1982, at 32, col. 1.
92. Id. A similar instance of an embargo spurring technological development is the U.S.
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With regard to the pipeline project, it is important to remember that
the Soviet Union is currently constructing five domestic pipelines, in addi-
tion to the transnational Urengoy pipeline.93 Moreover, the element of So-
viet national pride should not be belittled." Had the 1982 gas and oil em-
bargo been successful, the Soviets could have diverted existing compressors
and turbines earmarked for the domestic pipelines to the Urengoy pipeline
so that it would be completed on time, or with only a minimum delay."9
B. Symbolic Uses of Trade Controls
Regardless of whether export controls prevent the acquisition of goods
and technology by the target nation, such controls may be enacted for sym-
bolic purposes." Those who advocate their use for symbolic reasons hold
that the controls are successful if they communicate to the target nation
and to the world the political sentiments and policies of the nation employ-
ing the controls.'7 There are several reasons for employing symbolic con-
trols. They work to disassociate the U.S. from the target nation; they
denial of industrial diamonds to the Soviets in the 1950's. Industrial diamonds, necessary for
many precision industries, were embargoed during the Cold War when the Soviets did not
possess the technology to manufacture them. By the 1970's, industrial diamonds were the third
largest industrial export of the Soviets. See Kiser, What Gap? Which Gap?. 32 FOREIGN POL'Y
90, 91 (1978).
93. See Stern, supra note 83, at 33.
94. Because national pride is at stake the Soviets will be very unwilling to accept delays
in the completion of the pipeline. Stern says that the Soviets have an impressive reputation as
reliable suppliers and that they would be unwilling to sacrifice this. Id.
95. The experts seem to agree that the Reagan embargo would delay the pipeline by only
months and not years, and would not result in massive inconvenience to the Soviets. See US.
Sanctions, supra note 86; Text of Common Market Statement on Embargo, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1982, at A4, col. 1; and Schmemann, American Pipe Supplies Unneeded, Soviet
Says, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, at A6, col. 5.
96. Abbott, supra note 29, at 822.
97. Against these objectives, advocates of employing export controls for foreign policy
purposes contend that in certain cases it may be immaterial that embargoed products and
technologies are available to the target country from other sources. It may be more im-
portant, they argue, to set an example, to make a moral statement, even if other countries
choose not to join in imposing trade restrictions. The United States, they note, would not
want to export thumbscrews, for example, even if other countries were doing so. In this
view, some issues simply can't be determined through an economic cost-benefit analysis.
American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis, Proposals for Reform of Export Controls
for Advanced Technology 25 (1979) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter cited as A.E.I. Legisla-
tive Analysis). See Mufson, supra note 91, for an example of how trade denial symbolizing
moral disproval has been a part of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union for many
years. See also Elliot, supra note 42, at 293-297, for a criticism of using foreign policy con-
trols as a signaling device.
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demonstrate U.S. opposition to "abhorrent behavior"; and they build na-
tional "self respect."98 Therefore, while symbolic controls may be detrimen-
tal to U.S. economic interests, they may have desirable political results.
The Reagan Administration did not succeed in convincing the Euro-
pean allies to stop shipment of goods to the Soviet Union, but U.S. actions
effectively communicated to the world U.S. concern over Soviet activities.
Moreover, the export controls also provided administration officials with an
opportunity for increased publicity and media coverage." Such coverage
was used effectively by the Reagan Administration, and consequently made
the Administration appear, at first, decisive. It can be argued that the in-
tense media coverage also permitted the Administration to score propa-
ganda points in its war of words with the USSR.
These symbolic gains were extracted at a very high price, one which
many would argue is too high. The stated objective of the embargo was to
advance reconciliation in Poland. When the embargo was lifted, not only
was martial law in Poland still in force, but Soviet behavior in Afghanistan
and throughout the world had shown no sign of moderation. 00 While the
status quo with the USSR was maintained the embargo had a damaging
effect on the Western alliance. No member of the alliance supported the
embargo, and many openly defied it.' 01 The European Common Market of-
ficially criticized the embargo and said that the consequences of the em-
bargo could "call in question the usefulness of the technological links be-
tween European and American firms"' 0 and that the use of such
retroactive measures applied without proper consultation "are unquestion-
ably and seriously damaging. " 18 The Common Market nations further
claimed that "the ban was an unacceptable interference in European Com-
munity Affairs.''0
98. Abbott, supra note 29, at 822-824.
99. There are many examples of how the Reagan Administration took advantage of the
publicity opportunities offered by the embargo. Among the most effective devices to win public
support for the pipeline sanctions were the repeated allegations that the Soviet Union is using
slave labor to build the pipeline. See Mufson, Allegations Soviets Using 'Slave Labor' Heat
Up Debate Over Pipelines to Europe, Wall St. J. Aug. 17, 1982, at 32, col. 1; and Commerce
Department Modifies Temporary Export Denial Order for Creusot-Loire, U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY, No. 426, at 948 (1982).
100. See Merciai, supra note 5, at 17.
101. See id. at 13-17, for an analysis of European reaction to the pipeline embargo.
102. Text of Common Market Statement, supra note 95.
103. Id.
104. Europe Protests Bans by Reagan on Gas Pipeline, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1982, at
AI, col. 2.
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C. Other Considerations
Trade controls, whether for symbolic or for other reasons, can have
long lasting detrimental effects within the United States, as well as abroad.
Section 2405(c) of the E.A.A. requires the President to consult with indus-
try before imposing trade controls. While this consultation with American
industry is not binding, it is another factor a President should consider
when imposing trade controls, especially controls for symbolic purposes.
The symbolic gains of the export controls should be balanced against costs
to domestic industry.
The American business community strongly opposed the imposition of
the 1982 trade controls."' 5 Had it been successful, the pipeline embargo
would have cost U.S. industry somewhere between $300 to $800 million in
direct and indirect exports.'" Foreign subsidiaries and licensees were ex-
pected to lose up to $1.6 billion.? 7 Other costs are not easily measured.'"8
Sanctions such as those imposed in 1982 are likely to make European busi-
nesses more reluctant to enter into agreements with the U.S., and may spur
the investment of European firms in high technology industries of their
own. 109
Other reasons are advanced in opposition to export controls for foreign
policy purposes. Opponents view such controls as essentially unilateral;
whereas the United States has on several occasions linked controls to for-
eign policy objectives, 10 other nations generally do not take the same ap-
proach. Because the United States is one of the few nations to use export
controls for foreign policy purposes, and evokes much criticism thereby, use
of controls is seen as strengthening the position of aggressive, anti-U.S.
leaders."'
The symbolic use of export controls is a powerful tool for communicat-
ing U.S. policies to the world. Unfortunately, the adverse effects of sym-
bolic controls may vastly outweigh their advantages. Taken to their greatest
extreme, as was done in 1982, Foreign policy export controls penalize
American industry and create ill-will among trading partners, in order that
105. See. U.S. Sanctions, supra note 86, at 622.
106. Id.
107. This statistic may be conservative. Id.
108. "Among the salutory influences that can be expected from accelerated expansion in
foreign purchases of U.S. products are stronger economic growth, higher levels of employment
and lower rates of unemployment, quickened capital formation, and abated inflationary pres-
sures." S.H. RHINE, THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS ON U.S. EXPORTS 111 (1981) (quoting
Kenneth A. Randall).
109. U.S. Sanctions, supra note 86, at 622.
110. A.E.I. Legislative Analysis, supra note 97, at 24.
111. Id. at 25.
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the target nation and the world may know the Executive Branch's viewpoint
on activities that are beyond the United States' ability to control.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dresser controversy provides an excellent opportunity to study the
use of export controls. It is apparent that if the U.S. intends to accomplish
foreign policy objectives by controlling the export of American goods and
technology, stronger provisions must be enacted to guarantee enforcement
of the E.A.A. 1 1'
This enforcement problem can be approached in several ways. First,
the sanctions that can be invoked against the American parent corporations
of foreign subsidiaries and licensees, which are clearly subject to U.S. juris-
diction, should be strengthened. In the Dresser case, the evidence suggests
that Dresser Industries supported and abetted its subsidiary Dresser
(France) in defying the U.S. sanctions.118 Had the Reagan Administration
been able to apply more coercive measures against Dresser Industries,
Dresser may have opted to support the Government's efforts by preventing
its subsidiary, Dresser (France), from shipping merchandise to the Soviets.
Second, enforcement of the E.A.A. should be strengthened through the
resolution of the jurisdiction problems mentioned in section two of this
Note. For the E.A.A. to be more effective as a foreign policy tool, the U.S.
government needs a procedure that will guarantee quick and efficient legal
recourse against foreign licensees and subsidiaries attempting to violate
U.S. trade controls.
Such legal recourse could be obtained by international agreement. One
possibility would be a multilateral agreement assuring international "full
faith and credit" for the rulings of a signatory's court in matters relating to
the final destination of a nation's exported goods and technologies. This
would allow governments to control their multinational corporations and
firms that license equipment for production or use abroad. Further, it would
be a step toward insuring that foreign governments, foreign licensees, and
foreign subsidiaries respect U.S. export laws and regulations.
A second possibility for resolving jurisdiction and E.A.A. enforcement
problems would be the establishment of a new international tribunal that
would specialize in litigation concerning multinational corporations, foreign
subsidiaries, and companies manufacturing goods under foreign licenses.
112. Members of the U.S. Senate, including the late Sen. Henry Jackson, voiced strong
concerns over the inadequacy of enforcement. See Options on Tightening Poland Controls
Said Ready for White House Consideration. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY, No. 395, at 533 (1982).
113. See supra note 27.
[Vol. 8
DRESSER INDUSTRIES AND THE EAA
Because of its limited scope, such a new court might be more acceptable to
the United States than the International Court of Justice."'
It is doubtful, however, that the United States or any other nation
would be willing to submit to compulsory jurisdiction for the resolution of
inherently political questions. It is important to recognize that while the
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the E.A.A. may be legal in na-
ture, it would not have arisen but for the foreign policy motives of the Rea-
gan Administration. The sanctions imposed in June 1982, which purported
to reach beyond U.S. territory, were an attempt to overcome the failure of
the more limited January 1982 sanctions. 15 The sanctions were imposed
explicitly for foreign policy purposes."1 It can be argued, therefore, that
regardless of whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is legally permissible, the
President will more likely be guided in the future by political
considerations.
The Export Administration Act itself provides substantial guidance
concerning the circumstances in which the Executive Branch should enact
export controls. Whether the President is enacting the controls for symbolic
purposes, or to influence the behavior of foreign nations, the recommenda-
tions of the E.A.A. should be followed. Specifically, special attention should
be given to the effect of U.S. trade controls on domestic industries.
Unfortunately the trade controls in the Dresser case apparently were
not imposed in accord with the E.A.A.'s recommendations. The primary
effect of the 1982 sanctions was to penalize U.S. industry for the sake of
controls that were destined from the outset to be ineffective and disrupt
political and trade relations abroad. Even if it were acknowledged that the
controls were primarily symbolic in purpose, this would be slight justifica-
tion for enacting controls when the United States has many other methods





114. A third possibility would be an international code of conduct to provide guidance in
future disputes over jurisdiction over multinational corporations. See Merciai, supra note 5, at
37.
115. See supra note 5.
116. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
117. "Before resorting to the imposition of export controls under this section, the Presi-
dent shall determine that reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of the
controls through negotiations or other alternative means." Export Administration Act of 1979
§2405(d).
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